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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(8)(a); 63G-4-
403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a). Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies 
available at law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE ONE 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error 
when she failed to resolve all conflicts in the evidence. 
Standard of review: The application of the law by the Labor Commission 
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor 
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998). 
ISSUE TWO 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge committed reversible error when she failed 
to make the requisite findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible. 
Standard of review: The application of the law by the Labor Commission 
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor 
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, RULES, OR 
CONSTITUTIONS 
ISSUE ONE 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv); 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413; and 
Utah Admin. CodeR. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e). 
ISSUE TWO 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i); 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413; and 
Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 14, 2005, respondent filed an Application for Hearing on the issues 
of medical expenses, recommended medical care and permanent total disability 
compensation. Petitioners filed their response on December 28, 2005. On May 15, 2006, 
a hearing was held on respondent's application for hearing. And, on January 5, 2007, 
Administrative Law Judge Deidre Marlowe issued her Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law; Award of Subsistence Benefits. ALJ Marlowe found that respondent had 
suffered an accident while in the course and scope of his employment. She also held that 
respondent's lumbar conditions were medically causally connected to the industrial 
accident. Last, she found that respondent was unable to perform basic work activities as 
evinced by his limitations and need for time off. However, the ALJ failed to specifically 
identify what these limitations were for respondent. 
On February 6, 2007, petitioners filed a letter indicating their intent to file a 
rehabilitation plan. And, on April 26, 2007, petitioners filed a reemployment plan. 
Respondent objected to the plan and an evidentiary hearing was held on May 16, 2007. 
On September 3, 2007, ALJ Marlowe issued her Order of Permanent and Total 
Disability. She found that petitioners' reemployment plan did not meet the restrictions or 
needs of the respondent and that the plan was not reasonably designed to return him to 
gainful employment. 
Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on 
October 3, 2007 and Brief in Support of Motion for Review on October 24, 2007. 
Respondent replied on October 23? 2007. And, on August 31, 2010, the Labor 
Commission issued an Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. The Labor Commission denied 
petitioners' argument that ALJ Marlowe's preliminary decision provided insufficient 
guidance to allow for preparation of a reemployment plan. 
Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals on 
September 30, 2010, for review of the entire Order of the Commission. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Respondent Stewart Seely (petitioner below before the Labor Commission) was 
employed as an x-ray technician at St. Mark's Hospital in 1988. In 1999, he transferred 
to Timpanogas Regional Hospital. Respondent suffered an initial injury to his low back 
in 1996 when he lifted a 5 gallon container at St. Mark's Hospital. On October 19,1996, 
Dr. Bradley Noblett performed a left L3-4 hemilaminectomy and discectomy. 
Respondent had continued complaints of back pain and left calf numbness. Dr. Joel Dall 
provided claimant a 10% whole person impairment rating on August 28, 1997. On 
February 23, 2000, respondent was helping transfer an ICU patient from the x-ray table to 
the ICU bed when he pulled his back. Respondent alleges that the patient weighed 
between 250 and 300 pounds. 
An MRI taken on March 29, 2000, showed a disc herniation at L4-5 with some 
effect upon the nerve root. An L4-5 discectomy and never root decompression was 
performed on July 7,2000 by Dr. Lynn Gaufm. On November 10, 2000, a 
decompression at L4-5 and a pedicle screw fixation was performed. Dr. Gaufm stated 
that respondent could return to work in the light to medium duty category. He also stated 
that a 35 pound lifting restriction would be ideal. 
In 2002, Dr. Jeffrey Chung examined the respondent and stated that he could 
return to work, however, he recommended that respondent have restrictions of no lifting, 
pushing, or pulling with greater than 30 pounds of force. In 2003, Dr. Chung provided 
another statement on restrictions stating that respondent could work with 30-50 pound 
lifting restrictions. And, on July 28, 2003, Dr. Chung stated that claimant should not lift 
more than 50 pounds nor more than 25 pounds on a regular basis. 
On November 15, 2002, respondent took an overdose of his prescription pills and 
he was admitted to the emergency. As a result of his actions, respondent was required to 
see a psychologist. And on May 3, 2003, respondent's employment with Timpanogas 
Regional Hospital was terminated as a result of stolen narcotics. Respondent stated that 
he sought employment as an x-ray technician after his termination, but was told he would 
not be considered until his workers' compensation case was finished. 
Respondent was seen by Dr. Junius Clawson who recommended that respondent 
abide by a 50 pound lifting restriction. In 2004, Dr. Gaufm stated that respondent's 
advance degeneration would make it difficult for him to return to work. 
On December 14, 2005, Dr. Dall assigned respondent a 13% impairment rating in 
addition to the 10% impairment rating assigned for the 1996 back injury. It was Dr. 
DalPs opinion that medical management had not been optimized. And, in 2006, Dr. 
Chung agreed with Dr. Dall regarding respondent's impairment rating and stated that 
respondent could return to work with a maximum lift restriction of 35 pounds. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error when she failed to 
resolve all conflicts in the evidence. 
II. The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible error when she failed to 
make the requisite findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was 
possible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN THE CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE REGARDING 
RESPONDENT'S WORK RESTRICTIONS WERE NOT RESOLVED. 
The Utah Labor Commission, through the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
"ALJ") and Appeals Board, erred by failing to resolve the conflicts in the evidence 
regarding respondent's work restrictions. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i); 34A-
2-413; Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6); Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e). The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued on January 5, 2007 contain numerous 
inconsistencies and various different medical restrictions all of which are supported by 
medical opinions. The ALJ made reference to the various restrictions but failed to 
provide any sort of resolution. As a result, petitioners were not able to properly draft a 
reemployment plan because it was unclear which set of restrictions actually applied to the 
respondent. 
The court has held that "[i]t is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Carter v. Labor Com'n 
Appeals Board, 153 P.3d 763, 767 (Utah App. 2006). Here, the ALJ failed to resolve the 
inconsistencies and even cited to them in her order. The January 5, 2007 provides the 
following conflicting restrictions: 
1) "Dr. Chung indicted that Petitioner may perform job in the light to moderate 
categories of work - he should not lift greater than 50 pounds nor 25 pounds 
repeatedly." 
2) "On January 20, 2004 the Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Junius Clawson, 
who recommended a lifting restriction of 50 lbs." 
3) "Dr. Chung noted in March of 2002 that claimant could return to work with 
"no lifting, pushing or pulling with greater than 30 pounds of force." 
4) "Dr. Gaufin opined that the Petitioner could not return to work with the 
advanced degeneration in his back." 
5) Dr. Gordan George noted that the Petitioner reported he could sit/stand for 30 
minutes at a time. 
6) Dr. Chung indicated on May 3, 2006 that the Petitioner had a maximum lift of 
35 pounds and was not capable of transferring bedridden or wheelchair patients 
as he used to do. 
7) Dr. Gaufm indicated that claimant may be able to work "in light to medium 
category work." 
These restrictions provide little guidance for petitioners when drafting their 
reemployment plan. In one order, the restrictions range from an inability to return to 
work to a 50 pound lifting restriction. Such a gap is huge and provides an explanation as 
to why the ALJ found that the "reemployment plan submitted by Respondents does not 
meet the restrictions or needs of the Petitioner." The ALJ had an obligation to resolve 
the conflicts in the evidence regarding respondent's restrictions so that a comprehensive 
and reasonable reemployment plan could be submitted for consideration. As a result of 
the ALJ's failure, petitioners were denied the opportunity to submit a plan that was 
reasonably designed to return respondent to gainful employment. 
If the ALJ considered one set of restrictions controlling, her orders provided no 
direction. As noted above, references were made to various restrictions which were 
supported by medical evidence. The ALJ did not suggest that the opinions of one 
physician should be considered more than the opinions of any of the other physicians. 
She also made no mention as to whether or not the most recent restrictions should be 
given more weight. If recency was given the most weight, then petitioners' 
reemployment plan could have been designed around a 35 pound lifting restriction. 
However, no such guidance was implicitly or explicitly provided. 
The importance of the ALJ reaching a conclusion on the medical restrictions and 
the reemployment plan following those restrictions was recently detailed by the Court of 
Appeals of Utah as follows: 
"According to the June 14,2000 order, the plan was defective because the 
physical work restrictions . . . contained in the [rehabilitation plan] were materially 
different than those specified by Dr. Smith and referred to in the August 1998 
order awarding permanent total disability benefits." 
Color Country Management v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 969, 973-4 (Utah App. 2001). In 
Color Country Management the court held that respondent's reemployment plan was 
defective because it failed to provide subsistence benefits and because the work 
restrictions contained in the plan were not similar to those provided in the ALJ's order 
awarding permanent total disability benefits. Id. 
The ALJ's conclusions regarding respondent's restrictions further supports 
petitioners' argument that there was a failure to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. 
The January 5, 2007, order states that".. .Petitioner is 58 years old, has a high school 
diploma and has lifting restrictions as well as sit/stand restrictions..." And, in the 
September 3, 2007 order, after finding that the petitioners' reemployment did not 
consider respondent's restrictions, the ALJ concluded that the respondent had 
"significant sit/stand restrictions." 
As a result of the numerous restrictions and the lack of information regarding 
which restrictions the ALJ considered controlling, it is easy to see why the petitioners 
were unable to determine which of these restrictions were applicable. The ALJ should 
not have been able to conclude that rehabilitation was not possible without resolution of 
the medical restriction issue. Specifically, the ALJ denied the reemployment plan by 
finding that "with regard to the jobs identified, there is no indication of what weight and 
frequencies the petitioner would be able to lift." Accordingly, petitioners request that 
this matter be remanded for determination of the medical restrictions issue so that 
petitioners are given the opportunity to craft a specific rehabilitation plan for respondent 
that coincides with his restrictions. 
II. THE ADMmSTRATTVE LAW JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDINGS 
REGARDING WHETHER REHABILITATION WAS POSSIBLE. 
Until an ALJ reviews the reemployment plan and activities, a finding of 
permanent total disability is not final. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) 
states that: 
"the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing.. .to 
consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment 
plan.. .If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is 
not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that employee be paid 
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits." 
The ALJ could not have properly determined that the respondent was permanently and 
totally disabled because there were no findings made regarding what restrictions were 
preventing respondent from returning to gainful employment. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413; Utah Admin. Code R. 612-1-10(C)(1). Further, the ALJ made no determination 
regarding whether rehabilitation was possible. The order of permanent and total 
disability only states that petitioners' reemployment plan did not meet the restrictions or 
needs of the respondent. 
The statute asks the Commission to determine if other work is reasonably 
available, "taking into consideration the employee's[ ] . . . age;... education;... past work 
experience;... medical capacity; and... residual functional capacity." Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 393 (Utah 2007). And, the Court of Appeals has held that: 
"In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.... The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on material 
issues renders its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion." 
Strate v. Labor Com'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Utah App. 2006). 
In the case at bar, the evidence is not clear or uncontroverted. The evidence 
presented suggests that there are numerous interpretations which could be made from the 
restrictions before the ALJ. Despite these inconsistencies, the ALJ erroneously found 
that the reemployment plan was not designed to return the petitioner to gainful 
employment rather than determining whether successful rehabilitation was possible. 
Further, there were no findings made to support the conclusion that respondent 
was permanently and totally disabled except for the brief finding where the ALJ 
determines that the respondent has "significant sit/stand restrictions". There is 
significant evidence, including the various opinions of numerous physicians, showing 
that respondent could be returned to work within certain restrictions. Instead of making 
the requisite findings, the ALJ erroneously held that the reemployment plan was not 
reasonably designed to return the respondent to gainful employment. Without proper 
resolution of the medical restrictions issue, petitioners could not submit a meaningful 
rehabilitation plan and the ALJ cannot reach a proper conclusion regarding whether 
successful rehabilitation is possible. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the final 
order of the Labor Commission, below as an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, 
and not supported by substantial evidence, and remand for such other proceedings as 
necessary. 
DATE: day of December, 2010. 
THOMA 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, orders, jury instructions. 
None. 
B. Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as 
contracts or other documents. 
None. 
C. Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv): "The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: the agency action is: (i) 
an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; (ii) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; " 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): "(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:.. . (g) the agency 
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
cour t ; . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413: (1) (a) In the case of a permanent total disability 
resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive 
compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as 
a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease is the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for 
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; 
and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those 
provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(e) In determining under Subsections (l)(b) and (c) whether an employee cannot 
perform other work reasonably available, the following may not be considered: 
(i) whether the employee is incarcerated in a facility operated by or contracting with a 
federal, state, county, or municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a 
secure or nonsecure setting; or 
(ii) whether the employee is not legally eligible to be employed because of a reason 
unrelated to the impairment or combination of impairments. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week 
entitlement, compensation is 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury; 
(b) (i) subject to Subsection (2)(b)(ii), compensation per week may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week and: 
(A) $5 for a dependent spouse; and 
(B) $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
dependent minor children; and 
(ii) the amount calculated under Subsection (2)(b)(i) may not exceed: 
(A) the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a); or 
(B) the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under 
Subsection (2)(b) is 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest 
dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of 
permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for 
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-
2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall for an overpayment of compensation 
described in Subsection (3)(b), reimburse the overpayment: 
(i) to the employer or its insurance carrier; and 
(ii) out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee receives compensation from the employee's employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent 
total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the 
employer or its insurance carrier satisfies its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 
34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability 
compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for 
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-
2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier may recoup the overpayment of 
compensation described in Subsection (4) by reasonably offsetting the overpayment 
against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities 
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8a, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably 
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless 
otherwise stipulated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier 
under Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (5)(a), the 
administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for 
the employee's subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in 
Subsection (5)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability 
payments made under Subsection (5)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation 
liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment 
plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject 
to Subsections (5)(e)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include, but not require an employee to pay for: 
(A) retraining; 
(B) education; 
(C) medical and disability compensation benefits; 
(D) job placement services; or 
(E) incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide 
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan is cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own 
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(g) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that pursuant to a reemployment plan, as 
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider and presented under Subsection (5)(e), an 
employee could immediately or without unreasonable delay return to work but for the 
following, an administrative law judge shall order that the employee be denied the 
payment of weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits: 
(i) incarceration in a facility operated by or contracting with a federal, state, county, or 
municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a secure or nonsecure 
setting; or 
(ii) not being legally eligible to be employed because of a reason unrelated to the 
impairment or combination of impairments. 
(6) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became 
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on 
the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently 
totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job 
earning at least minimum wage, except that the employee may not be required to accept 
the work to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security 
disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall: 
(i) fully cooperate in the placement and employment process; and 
(ii) accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the 
work provided under Subsection (6)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the 
employee's income in excess of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a 
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work 
subject to the offset provisions of Subsection (6)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset, 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (6) is governed by Part 
8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier has the burden of proof to show that 
medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any work: 
(A) that would require the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's: 
(I) medical capacity; or 
(II) residual functional capacity; or 
(B) for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability 
benefits as provided in Subsection (6)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-
time work is offered, but the employee fails to fully cooperate. 
(7) When an employee is rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial 
disability. 
(8) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to 
disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or 
reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The 
administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an 
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, 
unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the record justifying 
dismissal with prejudice. 
(9) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of the following constitutes 
total and permanent disability that is compensated according to this section: 
(i) both hands; 
(ii) both arms; 
(iii) both feet; 
(iv) both legs; 
(v) both eyes; or 
(vi) any combination of two body members described in this Subsection (9)(a). 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (9)(a) is final. 
(10) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent 
total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (9), for which the insurer or self-
insured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the employee 
remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an 
award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to one or more reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to one or more reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and 
retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of one or more sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved 
by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with 
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and 
per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in 
supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of 
reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a 
permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension 
of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with 
the reexamination. 
(f) (i) If the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveals evidence that 
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total 
disability compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the 
Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The insurer or self-insured 
employer shall include with the petition, documentation supporting the insurer's or self-
insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (10)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined 
by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at 
a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work 
may not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability 
entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-time work under Subsection (6) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing 
with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition. 
Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e): C. For permanent total disability 
claims arising on or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a two-step 
adjudicative process. First, the Commission must make a preliminary determination 
whether the applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so, the Commission will 
proceed to the second step, in which the Commission will determine whether the 
applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated. 
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On receipt 
of an application for permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudication 
Division will assign an Administrative Law Judge to conduct evidentiary 
proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet each of the 
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(l)(b) and (c). 
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the elements set forth in 
Subsections 34A-2- 413(l)(b) and (c), the ALJ will issue a preliminary determination 
of permanent total disability and shall order the employer or insurance carrier to pay 
permanent total disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the 
second step of the adjudication process. The payment of permanent total disability 
compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination shall commence as of the date 
established by the preliminary determination and shall continue until otherwise 
ordered. 
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary determination may obtain 
additional agency review by either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board 
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-801(3). If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's 
preliminary determination is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals 
Board, no further adjudicative or enforcement proceedings shall take place pending 
the decision of the Commissioner or Board. 
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor 
Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate 
judicial review. 
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the Appeals Board or an 
appellate court, an appeal of the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of 
"second step" proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent total disability 
compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination. 
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant a request for stay if the 
requesting party has filed a petition for judicial review and the Commissioner or 
Appeals Board determine that: 
(i) the requesting party has a substantial possibility of prevailing on the merits; 
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable injury unless a stay is granted; and 
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to other parties to the proceeding. 
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-
413(6), if the first step of the adjudicatory process results in a preliminary finding of 
permanent total disability, an additional inquiry must be made into the applicant's 
ability to be reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional 
proceedings. 
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether the applicant can be 
reemployed or rehabilitated. 
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a summary of reemployment 
activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan meeting 
the requirements set forth in Subsection 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-
413(6)(d)(i) through (hi). 
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b) the employer or insurance carrier may 
not be required to pay disability compensation for any combination of disabilities of 
any kind in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks 
at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate. 
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may be recouped by the employer 
or insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability 
paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject to the provisions of 
Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above, but can be funded 
by reasonably offsetting the advance of disability compensation against future 
liability normally paid after the initial 312 weeks. 
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation to provide for an employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of future weekly 
disability compensation payments may be discounted from the future to the present 
to accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, the employer or insurance 
carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts paid against future liability 
payable after the initial 312 weeks. In this process, care should be exercised to 
reasonably minimize adverse financial impact on the employee. 
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the reasonableness of any proposed 
offset, the matter may be submitted to an ALJ for determination. 
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413(7) and (9) require the applicant to fully cooperate in 
any evaluation or reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in dismissal of the 
applicant's claim or reduction or elimination of benefit payments including disability 
compensation and subsistence allowance amounts, consistent with the provisions of 
Section 34A-2-413(7) and (9). 
(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer or its insurance carrier to 
diligently pursue any proffered reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in a 
final award of permanent total disability compensation to the applicant. 
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second step" proceeding, the ALJ 
concludes that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a final 
order for continuing payment of permanent total disability compensation. The period 
for payment of such compensation shall be commence on the date the employee 
became permanently and totally disabled, as determined by the ALJ. 
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" proceeding, the ALJ 
concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible, the ALJ 
shall enter a final order to that effect, which order shall contain such direction to the 
parties as the ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and 
continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary under the 
particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order shall provide for 
reasonable offset of payments of any disability compensation that constitute an 
overpayment under Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b). 
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and judicial review provided 
by law. 
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other 
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if 
such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's 
community would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is 
within the distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the 
claimant was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee 
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect. 
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